Wanting, Acquiescing, and Neg-raising
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Introduction. I argue that neg-raised readings for negated sentences containing *want* are the result of *want* expressing an underlying weak (existential) quantificational force, which gives rise to the globally strong ($\neg\exists$) meanings under negation. The universal interpretation that is attested for non-negated *want*, then, is derived through strengthening by exhaustification in a manner analogous to free choice disjunction as analyzed in Fox (2007). As evidence for this view, I examine a puzzle discussed in Homer (2015) involving an apparent scopal ambiguity between *want* and the presuppositional adverbial *no longer*. I show how the proposed analysis for *want*, motivated by new data, provides a solution to the puzzle.

Homer's observation. Assuming that the negative adverbial *no longer* presupposes that the proposition denoted by the clause that is in its scope used to be true prior to utterance time (UT), sentence (1a) is ambiguous between narrow and wide scope of *want* with respect to *no longer* (Homer (2015)).

(1) a. Consumers no longer want to be kept in the dark about food. (WANT > NO LONGER)
     b. Consumers no longer think they're kept in the dark about food. (*THINK > NO LONGER)

Homer suggests that on its most salient reading, *want* takes wide scope, as it is not assumed that consumers ever had a desire to be kept in the dark (although it can also have this less natural interpretation). While Homer assumes that *want* is a neg-raising (NR) predicate, he claims that it isn't this property that is responsible for removing it from the presupposition of *no longer*. Homer follows Gajewski (2005) in attributing NR to a lexical excluded middle (EM) presupposition carried by these verbs that allows NR to be derived while the verb remains in the syntactic scope of negation. This property is not sufficient to derive wide scope over *no longer*. This is shown by the behavior of NR verb *think* in (1b), which only has the meaning where *think* is within the presupposition of *no longer* (i.e. requires assuming that consumers used to think they were kept in the dark). The apparent absence of *want* from the presupposition of *no longer* in (1a), then, leads Homer to hypothesize that *want* can take scope over *no longer* via QR.

New evidence. The data in this section show, contrary to Homer's hypothesis, that *want* is within the scope of *no longer* in (1a). While I agree that it doesn't presuppose that consumers used to have a desire to be kept in the dark, the meaning of *want* is not entirely absent from the presupposition. Instead, (1a) appears to require the weaker assumption that consumers in some way used to *be OK with* or *acquiesce to* being kept in the dark (a presupposition that is consistent with a context in which the actual desire is presupposed, hence the apparent ambiguity). To sharpen this intuition, consider a context where speaker A never found it acceptable that Trump would be president, and in fact always wanted it to be the case that Trump not be president. In this context, (2a) uttered by speaker A is bad, while (2b) is fine.

(2) a. # I no longer want Trump to be president.
     b. I want Trump to no longer be president.

The contrast in (2a-b) would be mysterious under the assumption that *want* can QR over *no longer*. Here, covert movement of *want* in (2a) should be a way of removing *want* from the scope of *no longer*, in order to derive the intended meaning that can be expressed in (2b). The contrast, however, is predicted if (2a) requires the presupposition that the speaker used to *acquiesce to*, or *be OK with* the proposition that Trump is president. As this is not supported by the context, the sentence is bad. Since (2b) presupposes only that Trump was president at a time before UT, the sentence is fine. Additional evidence against assuming scopal ambiguity comes from the intuition that sentences of the form *x no longer wants p* are not felicitous if *p* was not known by *x* to be a live possibility prior to UT, as shown in (3a-b).

(3) Context: Speaker just found out that Bill smokes.
     a. # Wow, Bill smokes?! I no longer want him to do that.
     b. Wow, Bill smokes?! I want him to no longer do that.

This contrast, too, would be mysterious assuming that *want* can QR over *no longer*. It is predicted, however, if (3a) presupposes that the speaker used to *acquiesce* to Bill smoking, as intuitively, *acquiescing* to *p* requires knowing that *p* is a salient possibility.

Proposal. I take the weaker than expected presupposition of (1a), to be indicative of a basic existential meaning for *want* (the *acquiesce* reading). I then follow other work that derives strengthened meanings

in UE contexts when exhaustification (*Exh*) applies (with the crucial assumption of the lack of a stronger scalar alternative (Bowler (2014), a.o.)). I adopt a mechanism based on Bassi & Bar-Lev (2016)'s treatment of bare conditionals, and apply it to a denotation of *want* similar to the one given in von Fintel (1999). But instead of universal quantification over worlds, I propose existential quantification, and also that the domain that *want* quantifies over is restricted by a domain variable *D*, realized in the syntax, as in (4). Here, Des(x, w, t) is the set of worlds maximally consistent with *x*'s desires in *w* at *t*.

(4) $[[\text{want}_D]]^{w,t}(x)(p) = 1$ iff $\exists w' \in Des(x,w,t) \cap D : p(w')(t) = 1$

Now, the attested NR meaning is derived under negation and in the scope of neg DPs simply by negating the basic meaning in (4), without the need to stipulate an EM presupposition. To generate the attested universal interpretation in positive environments, I hypothesize that *want$_D$* triggers subdomain alternatives, following Chierchia (2013)'s analysis of polarity items (where Alt(want$_D$) = {want$_{D'}$: $D' \subseteq D$}). Assuming that $\exists$ quantification over the worlds in each subdomain is logically equivalent to asserting that *p* is true in a disjunction of the worlds in each domain, and that *want* has no stronger lexical alternative (which seems correct, as *want* has no obvious dual), the space of alternatives created will not be closed under conjunction, and will thus be similar to that of free choice disjunction. I will then assume an *Exh* operator applies, as proposed in Bar-Lev & Fox (2017), in which *Exh* negates all stronger innocently excludable (IE) alternatives, then asserts all of the innocently includable (II) alternatives. Here, as is the case with free choice, although the subdomain alternatives are stronger, none are IE. Next, since no stronger scalar alternative was excluded in the first step, all domain alternatives are II, and are asserted. Just as disjunction strengthens to conjunction in the case of free choice, $\exists$ quantification strengthens to $\forall$ in the case of *want$_D$*. In the case under negation, *Exh* is vacuous, as all domain alternatives are entailed. Also, deriving the non-NR interpretation of negated *want* would require *Exh* embedded under negation, which is generally dispreferred, and requires special intonation (Fox & Spector (2018)).

Contrast in (1a-b). In the entry in (5), *no longer* presupposes that an interval exists before matrix time, throughout which the complement was true, and asserts that the complement is not true at matrix time.

(5) $[[\text{no longer}]]^{w,t}(p)$ is defined only if $\exists i < t: \forall t' \in i: p(w)(t') = 1$. If defined, $= 1$ iff $p(w)(t) = 0$.

(6) $[[\text{no longer}]]([[\text{want}_D]]([[\text{consumers}]])([[\text{PRO to be kept in the dark about food}]]))$

With the entries above, sentence (1a), represented in (6), presupposes the existence of an interval before UT, throughout which the set of worlds consistent with consumers' desires contained at least one world where they were kept in the dark about food (they used to *acquiesce*). It asserts that at UT, it's not the case that there exists a world in the set of worlds consistent with consumers' desires where they are kept in the dark (the NR interpretation). For (1b), I follow Gajewski (2005) in assuming that *think* expresses universal force and carries an EM presupposition. When embedded under *no longer*, the presupposition is triggered that consumers used to think they were kept in the dark. The assertion, combined with the EM presupposition then derives the NR inference (consumers now think they aren't kept in the dark).

Predictions. This analysis, in which strengthened *want* is the result of *Exh*, predicts that weak (*acquiesce*) readings should be detectable in additional (Strawson) DE environments, where *Exh* is optional (Bowler (2014), Fox & Spector (2018)). While this doesn't appear to be straightforwardly borne out in restrictors of universal/negative quantifiers, accounting for attested inferences in restrictors is difficult for many accounts of NR and homogeneity, and will need more work to fully understand. Data from conditionals and questions, however, suggest that this analysis is on the right track. In (7), for example, it is not assumed that anyone might really *want* to wait, or help move a box (as in that's what they desire). Intuitively, these are conditionals/questions about the addressee's *acquiescence* to a request to wait/help.

(7)   a.   If you want to wait here for a minute, I'll be right back
       b.   Do you wanna give me a hand with this box?

Selected References. Bar-Lev, Moshe E & Danny Fox (2017). Universal free choice and innocent inclusion. Semantics and Linguistic Theory, vol. 27, 95-115. Bassi, Itai & Moshe Elyashiv Bar-Lev (2016). A unified existential semantics for bare conditionals. Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, vol. 21. Bowler, Margit (2014). Conjunction and disjunction in a language without 'and'. Semantics and Linguistic Theory, vol. 24, 137-155. Fox, Danny & Benjamin Spector (2018). Economy and embedded exhaustification. Natural Language Semantics 26:1, 1-50. Gajewski, Jon (2005). Neg-raising: Polarity and presupposition. Ph.D. thesis, MIT. Homer, Vincent (2015). Neg-raising and positive polarity: The view from modals. Semantics and Pragmatics 8:4, 1-88.